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

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Cover: The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada crossing a stream near Ommen, The Netherlands, on April 10, 1945. From DND (Army) photo 49641, Public Archives of Canada


MAP SHOWING
THE ROUTE OF THE THREE
BRITISH ARMIES THAT CONVERGED
ON MONTREAL AFTER THE
FALL OF QUEBEC
1760
CARTE INDIQUANT
LES ROUTES DES TROIS
ARMÉES ANGLAISES QUI
SE SONT RENDUES A MONTRÉAL
APRÈS LA PRISE DE QUEBEC
THIS MAP WAS COMPILED FROM "AN HISTORICAL JOURNAL OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1757-1760" BY CAPT JOHN KNOX - LONDON 1769
LES DETAILS SUR CETTE CARTE ONT ÉTÉ TIRÉS DU LIVRE CI-HAUT MENTIONNÉ
QUEBEC JUL. 14
TROIS RIVIERES AUG. 8
LAC ST PIERRE
SOREL AUG. 12
CONTRECOEUR AUG 23
LONGUE POINTE SEPT. 7
LONGUEUIL SEPT. 6-8
CHAMBLY SEPT. 6
ILE AUX NOIX AUG. 25
CROWN POINT AUG. 11
TICONDEROGA
ALBANY
MONTREAL SEPT. 6
CHINE SEPT. 6
ILE PERROT SEPT. 4
LAC ST FRANCIS SEPT. 3
ISLE ROYALE AUG. 18-30
LA GALETE AUG. 17
OSWEGO AUG. 11
ROUTE OF GENERAL MURRAY SHOWING PROGRESS BY DATES
Left QUEBEC July 14
Arrived MONTREAL Sept. 8
LES ÉTAPES DE LA ROUTE SUIVIE PAR LE GÉNÉRAL MURRAY PAR ORDRE DE DATE
Départ de QUEBEC 14 Juillet
Arrivé à MONTRÉAL 8 Sept
ROUTE OF GENERAL AMHERST SHOWING PROGRESS BY DATES
Left OSWEGO Aug 11
Arrived MONTREAL Sept. 7
LES ÉTAPES DE LA ROUTE SUIVIE PAR LE GÉNÉRAL AMHERST PAR ORDRE DE DATE
Départ de OSWEGO 11 Aout
Arrivé à MONTRÉAL 7 Sept
ROUTE OF GENERAL HAVILAND SHOWING PROGRESS BY DATES
Left CROWN PT. AUG 11
Arrived MONTREAL Sept 6
LES ÉTAPES DE LA ROUTE SUIVIE PAR LE GÉNÉRAL HAVILAND PAR ORDRE DE DATE
Départ de CROWN PT 11 AOUT
Arrivé à MONTREAL 6 Sept

MILITARY MONTREAL

Hereward Senior*

Montreal is and has always been an excellent base for military operations in North America. On the other hand, it is impossible to defend except against raiders or a token force. Situated on the great highway of the St. Lawrence, between St. Mary's current, which was difficult to navigate, and the Lachine Rapids which presented a barrier to navigation, the advantages of its location were obvious. There was easy access to the Richelieu route to the south and the Ottawa to the west. It straddled the highways of the continent, but it was open on nearly all sides. Moreover, the mountain is not an advantage because cities must be built near the rivers, and it is not good to be overshadowed by the high ground.

The Indian village of Hochelaga, believed to have been near the present site of McGill, and visited by Jacques Cartier in 1534, was gone by the early seventeenth century, apparently a casualty of Algonquin and Montagnais raids. The city, or its ancestor - Ville Marie - was founded in 1642 in the teeth of an Iroquois offensive which, within a decade, would destroy the great Jesuit missionary settlement in Huronia, located in the Lake Simcoe area. Maisonneuve, who was responsible for the defence of the mission colony, led his party of forty men, women and children, to the island of Montreal against the advice of authorities at Quebec, who considered the chosen site untenable. Maisonneuve was drawn from the same class as the famous Musketeer D'Artagnan, and possessed much of his dash and ability. He would need it to defend the pallisades of the small post which he established at the junction of the small St. Pierre

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*Professor Senior, of McGill University, gave a similar paper at the 1974 OMMC conference.

River, now drained, and the St. Lawrence, near Youville Square.

After a year of grace, the site of the outpost became known to the Iroquois who began raids in 1643. The ultimate source of this threat to the city was the Dutch Fort Orange, that is, Albany, founded in 1624 about 200 miles south of Montreal, where fur-trading Iroquois acquired firearms which gave them an ascendancy over the Indian allies of the French, north and west of the St. Lawrence. Montreal survived because the Iroquois, even with firearms, could not take a defended post by assault, and were not able to concentrate long enough to undertake a siege operation. Their efforts were limited to guerrilla raids which harassed but never destroyed the colony. While security could only be found within the palisades, the needs of agriculture dictated work in the fields, and Maisonneuve established a system of watch-dogs and warning bells which made work in the fields possible but precarious, and it was still necessary to bring foodstuffs from France.

Until 1653, when the arrival of 153 reinforcements more than doubled its population, abandonment of the outpost was seriously discussed. Relatively secure, but still threatened - the second aspect of Montreal, its value as a base of operations, was noticeable. It commanded the route along the Ottawa, and in 1660 the ill-fated attempt of Dollard to harass Iroquois fur-trading parties was an early effort to realize its potentialities. Dollard's strategic conceptions were sound, but he under-estimated the number of his adversaries. Sixteen Canadiens and a hundred or so Indian allies were hardly a match for combined Iroquois war parties which may have numbered 1000 or more. It was only with the arrival of de Tracy in 1665 with the Carignan-Salières regiment that the potentialities of Montreal for

thrusts into the interior were realized. For this, outposts were required on the Richelieu-Champlain route and on the site of Kingston where what became Fort Frontenac was established in 1673. The new post was built from the resources of Montreal, and its expenses were more obvious than its benefits to contemporary Montrealers, as the Indian raids continued with the more formidable English replacing the Dutch but still supporting thrusts against Montreal from the base at Albany.

Defenses were improved, new pallisades and points of refuge were established at key points, but the needs of agriculture still demanded a scattered pattern of settlement which made complete security impossible. This was evident in 1689, when the Montreal-based thrust against the Iroquois brought about retaliation by a party of 1,500 braves who burned 56 of the 77 houses at Lachine and inflicted over 100 casualties, including captives.

Frontenac realized the dangers of remaining on the defensive. Yet he never felt strong enough to strike at the ultimate base of the raiders - Albany - and after the Lachine "massacre" was content to attack and destroy the more congenial target of Schenectady, which provided the background for the first attack on Montreal launched by Europeans. It was, perhaps, fitting that in 1670 the leader of the English party of 150 should bear the Dutch name of John Van Schuyler and that the attack was part of a larger plan involving the attack of Admiral Phipps on Quebec City.

But Montreal could not be taken by a token force, and the invaders withdrew after a raid on LaPrairie. A second Albany-based attack in 1693 by 260 New York militia, this time led by Peter Schuyler, was no more successful.

Yet the Iroquois menace remained, and it was not until the persistent efforts of Frontenac in the area south of Lake Ontario had reduced the number of Iroquois braves from 2,800 to 1,300 that serious negotiations were attempted and peace secured in 1701.

For Montreal, sixty years of terror had come to an end and until 1760, Montrealers could sleep in peace, leaving the outposts to take the shock of British efforts launched against French Canada. The population of Montreal was estimated at 1500 in 1713, in a province which perhaps numbered 20,000, and had risen to about 5,000 in 1760, apart from its war-time garrison.

The Royal government expended enormous sums on the construction of fortresses in North America, and in Montreal plans were made in 1716 for building walls of rough stone, eighteen feet high and four feet thick at the base, strengthened by thirteen bastions spaced along the four sides. Work proceeded slowly and the stone walls, according to reports of contemporaries, seemed to have been in a permanent stage of neglect, understandably so, as raids were unlikely and the best of walls would hardly withstand a siege. Yet there could be no doubt about the military value of Montreal, and it was there that Montcalm made his headquarters in 1757, apparently safe behind the outworks of Fort Ticonderoga, Crown Point and Fort Frontenac, waging war in the Ohio Valley while New Yorkers continued to trade with Montreal, and Pennsylvanians looked on as interested spectators. This security could not survive a determined British war effort which used sea power to bring armies to America and provided financial power to put the colonies' war effort into motion. Braddock was defeated and attacks against Ticonderoga beaten off, but with the

fall of Louisbourg and Quebec, the ring tightened. Yet, while Montreal remained, so did the French presence in North America. Some 1,150 Montreal militia men were present at the siege of Quebec. The attempt by Montcalm's successor, Lévis, to retake Quebec was launched from Montreal when French forces defeated Murray at Ste. Foy.

However, with the spring and the return of the British fleet, Montreal's position was hopeless as converging armies, numbering 17,400, arrived from three directions within forty-eight hours of one another - so remarkable an achievement of co-ordination that it is a temptation to attribute it to accident. As Lévis reputedly burned his flags and broke his sword on St. Helen's Island, Montreal was occupied by a British garrison which would remain until 1870.

There was a notable interruption in the winter of 1775-76 when the revolt of the colonies again placed the outposts of Montreal, Ticonderoga and Crown Point, in hostile hands. By 18 May 1775 an invading force had reached St. John's, and there was a mixed reception to the recruiting efforts of authorities. As Montreal merchants received envoys from the invaders, Ethan Allen, in the vicinity of Longue Pointe, relearned the lessons taught to Van Schuyler in the seventeenth century - that Montreal could not be taken by a token force. Ethan Allen was captured and sent as a prisoner to Quebec. Yet when St. John's and Fort Chambly fell, there could be no question of defending Montreal. No regulars were available and the population, both French and English, was somewhat more concerned with winners and losers than with loyalism and independence. Among those Montrealers whose loyalty to the English Crown remained unshaken was the former French officer, Pierre

Guy, who had served under Montcalm at Carillon, Montmorency and the Plains of Abraham. Guy again took up arms against his country's invaders and this so exasperated the Americans that they sacked his stores after the capitulation of the city and he later received a large tract of land in Montreal from the Crown in compensation.

When the fortunes of war turned against Arnold and Montgomery at Quebec, only twelve prominent Montrealers left with the retreating continental army, which still wore the royal insignia of the colonial militia, as they departed before the Declaration of Independence.

Montreal resumed its role as a base of operations directed southward. In one of the two decisive operations of the American colonial revolt, Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga suggests that Frontenac was wise in neglecting Albany, and that, later in 1814, Prevost's caution before Plattsburg was based on sound judgment. Montreal is more useful as a base for operations directed towards the west than against the Hudson River Valley. This, perhaps, is more debatable than the obvious difficulties of defending Montreal and, as 1812 cast its shadow, those planning the defense of Canada contemplated the withdrawal of British forces to Quebec City and combined operations along the Atlantic seaboard. Such plans ignored the fact that withdrawal to Quebec City would leave most of the population under enemy control and thus deprive the colony of the services of most of its militia. Without Montreal, the operations of Brock and his successors in Upper Canada would have been impossible, as the supplies for the garrisons from Kingston to Detroit came from or through Montreal.

The city, at that time, numbering perhaps 15,000, was the obvious objective for American military effort. Twice during the war, American forces moved against Montreal. The

first thrust halted at Lacolle in 1812 without firing a shot; the second more serious one was repulsed at Châteauguay in October 1813. Until regulars arrived in large numbers in 1814, much depended upon the militia, of which Montreal was able to raise 3,000. Among these were two "gentlemen's" companies, on whom a contemporary commented, "If their discipline was commendable, their larder was beyond praise. Long lines of carts were to be seen bearing in casks and hampers the choicest of wines, to say nothing of the venison, turkey, hams, and all the other esculents necessary to recoup their strength after the fatigues of war." Unfortunately, they were not typical, but some Montrealers, at least, approached hostilities in a holiday spirit. More effective were the Montreal-based Voltigeurs, a regular unit raised for wartime service in the provinces, who carried most of the honours at Châteauguay, fifteen miles south of Montreal, where 1200 under the command of Lt.-Col. Charles de Salaberry turned back an invading force of 5,000.

With the arrival of reinforcements in 1814, Montreal, as in the days of Montcalm, was again military headquarters, this time for operations against Plattsburg, which were prudently called off after the defeat on Lake Champlain. Although the British garrison remained the militia was not kept up after the war and the city appeared to be losing its military character as the old walls were pulled down in 1817. Two years later, the old wooden block house, built in 1685 on Citadel Hill near Dalhousie Square, was levelled and the Ordnance stores housed there were transferred to St. Helen's Island. Near the old French fort on Citadel Hill were the Quebec Gate barracks of the British garrison, originally a nunnery, enlarged in 1822 and capable of housing 1,000 soldiers and about eighty

horses, a garrison library and a theatre. Accommodation was later changed to provide more space for married quarters.

In 1818, St. Helen's Island was purchased by the War Department. Barracks were built for over 100 troops, and a cannon from a battery of twelve guns was fired at noonday and at six o'clock. Visiting the Island was a social occasion for the Montreal élite and, by degrees, its facilities were expanded to include bomb-proof shelters, additional stores and small cottages for pensioners.

In addition to the Quebec Gate barracks and those on St. Helen's Island, there were the Hochelaga Cavalry barracks, located beyond the city's eastern boundary, built during the troubles of 1837-38. In 1849 these were expanded to include a military prison and by 1868 had come to include numerous workshops, anticipating the present ordnance establishment at Longue Pointe.

Apart from an election riot in 1832, when officers were arrested and acquitted of responsibility in the death of three French-Canadians killed by the fire of troops during the riots, the garrison performed routine duties until the troubles of 1837. At this time, Montreal became the key to the political crisis. There could be no question of the Patriotes seizing Montreal by a coup within the city because of its garrison and the arming of loyalist militia. If the city was to be taken, it must be by a co-ordinated movement from the two centres of rebellion - the Richelieu Valley and the Lake of Two Mountains. Failing this, the Montreal garrison would dominate the countryside.

Charles Ogden, the attorney-general, in a report prepared for Sir John Colborne, commander of the forces, after examining captured documents, described the Patriotes' intention to seize key towns north and south of the island of Montreal, while floating ice on the river confined the garrison to the island. With these towns secured, the Patriotes would launch "a combined movement against the city when the strength of ice permitted". Ogden believed that this plan had the elements of success, particularly as the garrison would require part of its strength to keep the town under control. Yet everything depended on the weather, and the Patriote plan was defeated at the outset because the anticipated hazard to navigation - the ice - did not materialize when expected in early December. Without the ice, the garrison was free to move north and south of the St. Lawrence. The Patriotes found themselves on the defensive and, in spite of an initial repulse at St. Denis, the garrison overwhelmed them, first in the Richelieu Valley, and then at St. Eustache.

The outbreak of the rebellion revived the militia, largely dormant since 1814, and within two weeks the city and district of Montreal was able to raise 4,000 men out of a population of about 30,000. Most of this force was organized in three ward association battalions as part-time soldiers for the defense of the city. Their initial organization was undertaken by Louis Guy, the eldest son of Pierre Guy who had helped defend Montreal against the American forces in 1775. Louis Guy had served with distinction under de Salaberry in 1812-14 and for a time served in the British regular army. It was Guy to whom Sir John Colborne turned in November of 1837 for help in

enrolling loyal Montrealers. The ward battalions appear to have provided most of the 800 volunteers who were raised for general service for a period of six months. Detachments of this unit provided part of the garrison of St. Helen's Island and Chambly, allowing regulars to be withdrawn for the expedition against St. Eustache, and later served along the border during the raids of the Hunter lodges in 1838.

The hasty recruiting of 4,000 Montrealers created obvious problems in providing equipment, particularly for John Durnford of the Ordnance Department who wrote to his father that he was so terribly driven that he managed to get to church only three times in three months. As Durnford could not supply uniforms, ward militiamen wore dark jackets and trousers with distinctive stripes to indicate companies. The Scots wore tartan trews. Cross-belts of 1812 vintage were issued with army greatcoats and fur caps. The arms provided were Brown Bess muskets, and officers carried whatever swords they could find. Apart from ward battalions, there were four troops of cavalry, and companies of artillery and rifles. Drill was conducted in halls and warehouses.

Although the rebellion was soon over, it was followed by a long period of operations along the border lasting until 1839. Montreal was again headquarters for the forces which, at this time, included 21,000 provincial troops on continuous service and 12,000 regulars, more than the entire American army at this time, which numbered 9,197. Although the forces would shrink to several thousand in the 1840's, and the Montreal garrison to 1,600, Montreal would remain military headquarters until the departure of imperial troops in 1870.

It was in these years that the social prominence of the garrison was most noticeable. As the Queen's Herald ranked the commander of the forces above the governor in order of social precedence, it is evident that the position of the officer corps was high. Its cultural importance is perhaps suggested by the fact that the commander of the forces laid the cornerstone for McGill College in 1839 and the participation of Charles Dickens in the amateur dramatics of the garrison theatre in 1842. Regimental musicians played on public occasions such as St. Jean Baptiste day and St. George's day, when the band of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, stationed in Montreal between 1838 and 1852, was much in demand.

Law and order were understandably among the responsibilities of the garrison. The election riot of 1832 has been mentioned, and in 1843 troops were called out to control rioting canal workers at Lachine and for elections on three separate occasions in 1844. Prominent among the forces supporting civil power was the Montreal provisional cavalry, a survival of the volunteer forces raised in 1837, which was called in from its duties on the frontier in 1844. Election riots continued in 1846 and '47, an aide-de-camp to the military governor writing in his diary, "Municipal elections going on. A good many broken heads." Disturbances reached a climax in 1849 when the military was not called out until the mob had set fire to the Parliament building.

More serious were the Gavazzi riots in 1853 when the former Catholic priest, Alessandro Gavazzi, lectured in Zion Church, under the protection of the recently-arrived

Cameronian Regiment. By some misadventure, the troops, a thoroughly Protestant body themselves, fired into the Protestant congregation as they left the church, killing fifteen and wounding twenty-five. These riots were largely between the Irish and Protestant community with comparatively few French-Canadians involved.

War rather than police duties remained the main concern of the army and the outbreak of the Crimean War saw the imperial garrison in Canada fall below two thousand. By 1855 the Montreal garrison was reduced to 278 as pensioners were recruited to take over buildings vacated by British troops, and a new force of volunteer militia was raised to share the burden of defense. It is from that force that the present volunteer militia has descended.

Yet the withdrawal of the garrison was premature, as misguided efforts to recruit British troops in the United States brought on a new crisis. By 1857, there were nearly 4,000 troops in Canada and 1,100 in Montreal, but the impulse towards economy was strong and on the eve of the American Civil War numbers had fallen below 3,000 in the province and 401 in Montreal.

While it was possible to phase out the garrison, it was more difficult to phase out war and the Trent affair in 1861 brought heavy reinforcements from Britain, raising the provincial garrison to 12,000 and the troops in Montreal to over 4,000, where, under the pressure of the Fenian threat, the garrison remained at a relatively high level until its withdrawal to England in 1870.

The Fenian invasions of 1866 and 1870 were the first serious tests of the new volunteer militia. Montreal raised 2,000 volunteers out of a population of 70,000. A leading newspaper commented on the "grim joy" of Canadians who marched off to the border singing, "For beneath the Union Jack, we will drive the rabble back", borrowing the American tune of "Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are marching". The Fenian invasions provided military fanfare without tears and marked the end of military glory for some time to come.

Montreal volunteers marched west during the Riel rebellion of 1885, as they had in 1870, but the glamour of the imperial garrison was gone. With the passing of the Fenian raids and the Riel rebellions, Montreal ended its role as an objective and headquarters for North American campaigns and became in the twentieth century a base for overseas operations. In this role, it became a source of war materials and recruiting grounds for expeditionary forces. The first hint of this new role was noticeable in 1885 when Caughnawaga Indians joined British forces in the Sudan campaign where their special skill as boatmen made them useful in river warfare.

During the Boer war, Montreal militiamen volunteered for service with the Canadian units raised to serve in South Africa and their services are acknowledged by a memorial which stands in the centre of Dominion Square. Within a few days of the declaration of war in 1914, 3,444 Montrealers had volunteered, though this pace was not to be maintained: in both world wars conscription became a divisive

and serious political issue. It is, of course, difficult to separate the Montreal contribution from the general Canadian war effort. Among those who entrained for camp at Valcartier on August 25th, 1914, were volunteers from the 1st Royal Highlanders, the Royal Montreal Regiment, French-Canadians of the 65th Regiment, the Victoria Rifles and the Grenadiers. The history of these militia units is complicated, involving amalgamations and changes in name. For example, the oldest volunteer infantry in Montreal was organized in 1859 and soon became the Prince of Wales Regiment of Volunteer Rifles, and is now the Canadian Grenadier Guards. The present Royal Canadian Hussars with its splendid armoury on Côte des Neiges claim descent from volunteer cavalry organized in the War of 1812-14. The Royal Montreal Regiment was organized at the opening of the First World War from elements of the First Regiment of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, the Third Regiment of the Victoria Rifles, and the 65th Carabiniers de Mont-Royal. It became part of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, which included both French and English units. Two French-Canadian units of the Montreal militia, Le Régiment de Maisonneuve and Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, fought in the Normandy campaign and subsequent operations in North-West Europe, 1944-45.

By the Second World War, Montreal was clearly a world city and, as a city, its most spectacular role was that of air capital of the Allied forces. In the days before the United States entered the war, it was arranged to purchase aircraft there, get them across the border by some means, and fly them across the Atlantic from Montreal by way of Gander, Newfoundland. At first light two-engined Hudsons and, later, four-engined Liberators were flown by a civilian agency and

then by Royal Air Force Ferry Command with headquarters at Dorval, a temporary revival of the British garrison in Montreal. In two world wars, Montreal was the vital link between North American and trans-Atlantic operations directed towards Europe, reversing the role it had played in the Seven Years War as the objective of an European-directed war effort. The construction of the seaway in the 1950's suggests its capacity to continue its role in support of military operations overseas and, with the development of modern technology, the city again becomes a possible objective of European-based military operations. Montreal, a city founded by a soldier and born in war, which has acquired economic and cultural eminence, has not only preserved its military tradition, but has retained its strategic importance.

SILENT WITNESSES

HERBERT FAIRLIE WOOD and JOHN SWETTENHAM

Overseas war cemeteries and memorials, Canadian or of Canadian interest -- the history and the policy. The title was suggested by King George V's words, "I have many times asked myself whether there can be more potent advocates of peace upon earth through the years to come, than this massed multitude of silent witnesses to the desolation of war." Includes maps and more than 200 photos, both black & white and in colour.

Published in English and French (*Témoins Silencieux*) for the Department of Veterans Affairs and the National Museums of Canada by Hakkert, Toronto. Available from Marketing Services Division, NMC, 360 Lisgar St., Ottawa K1A 0M8, and booksellers across the country. $13.95.

Recommended especially for "next of kin", as a guidebook for visitors, and to students of military history



Public Archives of Canada

A SOUTH WEST VIEW OF ST JOHN'S

FORT SAINT-JEAN: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RESOLUTE RESISTANCE OF 1775

Jacques Castonguay*

If it had not been for the resolute resistance of Fort Saint-Jean, what would have become of Canada in 1775? Perhaps it would have been the fourteenth American state, as the thirteen rebel colonies had desired. It is even difficult to say with any degree of certitude what it would be to-day.

The city of Quebec prevented Canada from being taken over by the American Revolutionary army, and it may not be an exaggeration to say that it was Saint-Jean which saved Quebec. One of the principal reasons why Arnold and Montgomery were not able to capture Quebec on the 31st of December, 1775, was the stubborn resistance put up by Major Preston's small army at Fort Saint-Jean the same year. The Americans had hoped to conquer Canada early in the fall of 1775; however, their plan was thwarted and rendered unrealizable by the prolonged resistance they met on the Richelieu.

Decimated by the hardships encountered on the Kennebec and Chaudière rivers, and more particularly in the swampland between these two rivers, the army of Benedict Arnold was reduced by a good third when it finally reached Quebec. Furthermore it was the 8th of November and not early October as they had counted on at the outset. When Quebec refused to surrender, the first American army could do nothing else but camp at Neuville and wait for Montgomery

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*Doyen, Administration et Humanités, Collège royal militaire.

who was still sweeping down the Richelieu.

On the other hand, Montgomery's army encountered a no less difficult task. Instead of taking Montreal early in September, it was engaged at Fort Saint-Jean from the 6th of September until the 3rd of November. And it was not until the 13th of November that Montreal capitulated.

Obviously, this delay saved Quebec and the rest of North America. When Montgomery finally made his rendez-vous with Arnold winter had already set in. It was the 2nd of December. By that time Montgomery's army was weakened and demoralized by the long siege of Saint-Jean. Already reduced in strength by numerous casualties and desertions, this undisciplined army, which was poorly clothed, badly undernourished, and poorly equipped, attacked headlong the well-fortified walls of the capital on December 31, during a violent snow-storm. Launching his attack towards Saint Roch (lower town) Arnold, in a single thrust, lost almost his whole army. They were encircled and taken prisoner. If, early in September, like Fort Chambly, Fort Saint-Jean had capitulated without resistance, the assault on Quebec would have been altogether different: leading a larger force of fresh troops, better equipped, and psychologically better prepared, under much better weather conditions, Arnold and Montgomery would have easily crushed Carleton's small defending force.

As an intelligent military man, Arnold was convinced that the Canadian winter was the real cause of his failure at Quebec. On February 24, 1778, when the question again arose of invading Canada, Arnold wrote to Governor Morris that he was very surprised to learn that an expedition was afoot against

Canada. From his experience he felt that a winter invasion of this country would be fraught with severe hardship, especially if its leaders, even though very capable, were strangers to the country, as would be the case with the Marquis de Lafayette and General Conway. He even predicted that it would miscarry and that the chance of its success would be one in twenty.

CANADIAN PATTERN SWORD?



In the *Canadian Journal of Arms Collecting*, Vol. 12, No. 2, Norman J. Crook contends that the sword shown above (NMC photo 74-18242) is a first Canadian design and purchase. Final proof is not yet available, but there is increasing circumstantial evidence in favour of the contention. It is therefore recommended that, for the time being, museums having swords of this pattern should treat them as Canadian Cavalry Pattern 1856. Moreover, the pattern is sufficiently rare that no museum is likely to regret acquiring one at the earliest opportunity.

John Chown
Canadian War Museum

A.S. MILLEN

The Executive regretfully announces the retirement of one of its members, Major Alex Millen, until September 1973 curator of the Royal Canadian Engineers Museum.

THE ROYAL AIR FORCE MUSEUM

John Tanner

This brief paper* may seem more discursive than the title warrants, but as the museum is the youngest of the British museums I feel it to be necessary to say what it is, how it came into being, where it is, and what it has set out to do.

The museum is at Hendon, a name synonymous with aviation history and on a site redolent with the atmosphere of early flying. Hendon is not quite the birthplace of British aviation but it can justifiably be called its cradle. In addition to its long service history and its world-renowned air displays throughout the inter-war period it has connections with most of the great names in the history of flight.

Among the many attributes which caused the site to be chosen were two hangars dating from 1915 - the earliest perfectly preserved Belfast-Truss hangars in the world. These, it was decided, were to be linked together to make a vast aircraft hall that would be the nucleus of the museum; the necessary galleries, library and ancillary requirements would be grouped around them, and a limited architectural competition was launched. The architects were given a brief as to the galleries required and were subjected merely to two overriding necessities: firstly the hangars were to be retained and linked; secondly, the capital cost of the new building was not to exceed £750,000.

Five architects submitted schemes: from four we received estimates ranging from a modest 100 per cent above

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*Dr. Tanner, Director of the RAF Museum, explains that this is what he had intended to say at the 1974 OMMC conference 'but I genuinely believe that if one can speak extempore... the effect is more desirable and pleasing to the audience.'

our limit to one, for a version of the Parthenon in bronze and glass, of considerably over £2,500,000. All four had swept away the hangars; at best their designs allowed for a token couple of aircraft. The creator of the new Parthenon assured me that few people would be interested in the contents and subject matter of the proposed new museum but his building would be a tremendous public attraction.

The fifth architect, Mr. Geoffrey Bodker, preserved the hangars, linked them together unobtrusively, giving room for about 40 complete aircraft, provided even more gallery space than specified, managed to include a 200-seat cinema, a restaurant, a splendid art gallery, a shop, and even threw in complete air-conditioning in the archive-library centre -- all well under the stipulated price. Frankly, those charged with the onerous duty of placing the commission were astounded. Then the industrial development group and Wimpeys, who had jointly caused Mr. Bodker to submit a scheme, asked Lord Holford to serve as consultant. That great architect and man kindly consented, gave readily of his opinions and advice, and fears retreated. Mr. Bodker's design is plain in structure, simple in the disposition of internal gallery space, and totally admirable as a handsome yet functional museum building. The curvature of the roof, incidentally, is not just an effort to avoid the matchbox style of architecture but reflects the shape of the hangar roofs of 1915. It also happens to be the strongest cheap form of pre-cast roofing possible and as such in any case had an almost irresistible appeal to one who knew that much of his immediate future was to serve as a professional beggar. I should like one day to see what the industrial development group and Mr. Bodker could do for a museum with a deeper purse.

I have harped on money, so I turn to the funding of this new national museum. When the project was again put to ministers -- it had been a popular recurring theme throughout the 1920's, 1930's and immediately after World War Two -- it was agreed that if, after the precedents set by some other national museums, the capital could be raised privately then its future costs would be met by the government. Incidentally, the question is often asked: who first thought of the museum project? The slightly surprising answer is that it was mooted by the erratic but brilliant Lord Rothermere in 1917, before the formation of the Royal Air Force. His sense of history and far-sightedness imbued him with the feeling that the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service were doing more than help win a war: they were creating new boundaries for science and technology and would by their efforts help towards developments that would bridge, in more senses than the purely physical, the gaps between nations. He had by the end of the war caused to be gathered together in the agricultural hall at Islington, of all unlikely places, the biggest and finest comprehensive collection of aeronautica ever assembled. It has long since disappeared: not one vestige of it remains today.

The financial offer was accepted. It was a bold step to take, because there was no solid foundation on which to build: the RAF had no formalised historic collection to serve as a nucleus; there was no site earmarked, and certainly no building; there was no benefactor in the background and no funds to hand. Everything was to be done from scratch. It was suggested to those of us involved that previously national museums under formation had possessed some firm basis before undertaking the necessarily complex and daunting tasks that

would have to be accomplished before a successful opening could be planned.

Fortunately a great figure of the service - Marshal of the RAF Sir Dermot Boyle - had in 1961-62 chaired a committee which was charged to look again into the practicality of the project. He has since 1963 steered the fortunes of the museum as the logical and indeed only choice to be at the head of a distinguished Board of Trustees who, if anything, relished the additional challenge that was their promised lot.

Initially the museum had a staff of one, myself, and not unnaturally progress was slow. It took some time before the collections started to grow to a size which justified the hope of being a true national museum; it took a long time to assess the numerous sites suggested, running the gamut from stately homes in darkest nowhere, to small (but admittedly elegant) little buildings in the Royal parks, and naturally ranging over many RAF controlled buildings. There was a strong effort, for example, to contain the project within the confines of what was reputed to be the oldest surviving Royal Flying Corps shed. This had the advantage from the official side's point of view of being so small of itself, and so isolated in location, that future running costs would be minimal. A tiny hidden building did not accord with the aspirations of the board and myself, but the offer was only fended off by gathering a weight of professional museum opinion that it was inadvisable to gather together in an all-wooden structure every available historical item it was wished to preserve, for the risk of fire was too great. The argument

won the day, although it was acidly noted that the shed had withstood two world wars and the ravages of generations of airmen without being reduced to ashes. Yet within weeks fire had swept it away, and to this day there are those who feel that someone connected with the museum will go to any lengths to prove a point!

Hendon, the site originally looked at with covetous eyes, was the right and proper place - it had space, buildings, good access by road and underground, a feeling of fitness for the purpose, and an air of history. Unfortunately, like all London land, it was also immensely valuable. The story of its acquisition makes a saga into which I cannot now enter, but the waiting was justified.

The time came to make the appeal for funds public, namely the 50th anniversary of the RAF in 1968. The building, landscaping, and interior designs and displays would altogether cost about a million pounds. One benefactor gave a six-figure cheque, but otherwise the money has been raised by diligence rather than through spectacular gifts. When diligence at the task of writing begging letters brought in a diminishing return we became entrepreneurs, and have been fortunate enough to make considerable sums through ventures launched and run by the museum. The trustees were very brave; when the order to start building was given we were only sure of about £300,000 and much of that was not actually in hand; but bravery was so well rewarded that when H.M. the Queen declared the museum open in November last we only owed the banks about £200,000. Happily, the debt is now down to a mere quarter of that figure, and we can foresee the day when the accounts will be in the black;

a far cry indeed from embarking on the expenditure of £1,000,000 with £700,000 still to find from somewhere.

The collections have become vast and acquisitions have been made on a worldwide basis with aircraft being retrieved, for example, from Iceland to Afghanistan. The new museum, apart from the aircraft hall of about 600 by 200 feet, contains 175,000 square feet of entry hall, galleries, library, cinema, administrative area, and so on. There is a conservation centre and a major reserve collection and workshop in the country. The staff has grown to about a hundred, and Sir Dermot Boyle still chairs virtually the same board - apart from two changing ex-officio members - that took the bold decision to go ahead.

The RAF Museum is the only national museum in Britain to tell the complete history of one of the services, from its predecessors back in the 1870's to its current and future activities in this century. It is also the only national museum to be devoted solely to the story of aviation - the histories of flying in general and the RAF in particular are inextricably linked - and the eleven galleries depicting this conspectus are arranged chronologically, thematically and, whenever possible, in environmental settings, so that something of the ethos and atmosphere of the time is captured for visitors who would otherwise know nothing of the manner of work and way of life represented by the artefacts.

The collections are basically divided into two. One is headed by the aviation historian, J.M. Bruce, in charge of the department of aircraft and aviation records; he is

supported by suitably qualified staff, including professional archivists and librarians, who administer very important collections. The department of exhibits and design is headed by Raymond Lee, who is responsible for displays throughout the eleven galleries, for the art gallery and art collection, the cinema and the workshops and reserve collections at Henlow. He too, is supported by appropriately qualified professional staff. The museum owes them and their staff an incalculable debt, for between them they somehow designed and set up all the displays, with every item at least adequately captioned and housed in purpose-built and specially-lit cases, in less than a year -- a truly prodigious feat, and one which many felt to be impossible of achievement although it was required of us by circumstances outside our control. There is a separate department for administrative and accountancy duties, and a remarkably busy public relations and education team.

We do not have that bronze and glass Parthenon that was going to be such a public draw, but contrary to that prejudiced prognosticator's views, the public have been interested. I used to prognosticate, that is mildly guess, that with luck we would attract a quarter of a million visitors a year. In fact we had more than 300,000 in our first six months and the graph seems to be rising. Over 1250 have been counted in the first fifteen minutes on a Sunday, and often side doors have been opened admitting uncounted visitors. We have had a jumbo-jet load from Japan, organised air tours from nine European countries - including, incredibly, a day trip from Yugoslavia -- and several parties are due from the USA.

But it is the response from the ordinary public that all connected with the museum have found so gratifying: Hendon is not of itself a place that has much to offer the sightseer; so our visitors have made the pilgrimage specially. That they have chosen to do so in such numbers is, hopefully, the justification for having created a large new institution and having done so by taking a begging bowl round so many people for so long. Needless to say, there is not a trustee nor member of staff who is content with what has been done, and plans for expansion have existed since the day after opening.

FROM THE RAF MUSEUM ART COLLECTION



Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers at Frensham Ponds, by Kenneth McDonough. The RE aviation element became the Royal Flying Corps in 1912. The RFC at first consisted of military and naval wings. In 1914 the latter became the Royal Naval Air Service, which it remained until the reunification of the RNAS and the RFC as the Royal Air Force in 1918

RAF MUSEUM - INTERIOR VIEWS



The early Vickers FB 5 ('Gunbus') fighter and late-1918 Vickers Vimy bomber. It was a Vimy that Alcock and Brown flew from Newfoundland to Ireland -- the first trans-Atlantic flight -- in June 1919



Belvedere helicopter, Lancaster bomber and Beaufighter

CANADIAN MILITARY SNOWMOBILES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Fred Gaffen*

Wheeled vehicles appeared long before tracked vehicles. While wheeled transport dates back to several millenia BC, the earliest verifiable reference to a tracked vehicle is contained in a patent of AD 1770 by Richard Edgeworth, who was seeking a method to navigate the British roads which became impassible in wet weather.[1] Prior to the First World War, the cross-country vehicle found to be the most satisfactory was a steam tractor with caterpillar tracks built in the United States by the Holt Company. This machine helped to inspire the development of the tank in the First World War. Among the weaknesses of the tank was its inability to navigate deep mud. When war broke out again in 1939, a suitable military vehicle that could travel over deep soft snow or mud had not been developed. One was required for winter travel, and the British sought Canadian assistance.

What was the history of transportation over snow in Canada? The native peoples had utilized snowshoes as well as toboggans and sleds pulled by dogs or men. The horse permitted the hauling of greater loads during the winter but only if the snow was not too deep and soft. In the nineteenth century, railways became a major means of safe transportation during the winter. Wheeled automotive transport over roads and the airplane in the twentieth century further improved communication in Canada.

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*In the course of his research, Mr. Gaffen acquired an M29C Weasel, a Mk III Penguin and a C-18S Bombardier, the closest relative to the B-1, for the Canadian War Museum.

By the Second World War, many types of snow vehicles had been built, but not one was rugged enough to travel over all types and depths of snow over long distances, and variable terrain, such as might be encountered during a military operation. The Department of National Defence had shown interest in snow-traversing vehicles, as evinced in tests involving the Godfredson[2] and other vehicles.

Many different types of snow vehicle had been designed in Canada. Some were wheeled, using special lug tires or with flexible tracks on the rear and skis in front -- in some cases attached to the front wheels, in other cases replacing the front wheels. There were also light vehicles driven by air propeller, known as snow planes. They were only suitable for use on fairly flat, open country. Among the many pioneers of the snowmobile in Canada, J.-Armand Bombardier led in the development of a suitable commercial cross-country vehicle. He had experimented with a snow plane and tracked vehicles, finding the latter preferable.

In 1942, Geoffrey N. Pyke, a civilian adviser to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, convinced Mountbatten of the feasability of warfare during the winter of 1942-43. A projected operation known as "Plough" would depend primarily on special vehicles that would give the Allies superiority in snow. Possible objectives were the Romanian oil fields and hydro-electric plants in northern Italy and Norway. Lord Mountbatten, Pyke and Lt.-Col. Robert T. Frederick, an American officer appointed to command the military force, found the Canadian government willing to provide men for the enterprise: hence a unit composed of

Americans and Canadians. Designated the First Special Service Force, it has come to be known as the "Devil's Brigade".

A snow-traversing vehicle for this operation that would give the users supremacy over the Germans had to be capable of movement over hard or soft snow, and transportable by glider, parachute and seaborne craft. It had to be able to reach a speed of at least 20 m.p.h. and to traverse hilly country. Each vehicle was to carry several commandos on a sabotage mission and then to quickly evacuate them from the scene. Less than a year was available to produce sufficient vehicles for the operation.

Actual work to develop a suitable snow vehicle for Plough began in the spring of 1942. A committee was set up that included Dr. G.J. Klein of the Mechanical Engineering Division of the National Research Council. The Studebaker Corporation, B.F. Goodrich Tire and Rubber Company, and other engineers and scientists worked together to produce a machine, and came up with one nicknamed by the Americans after the animal it most resembled: the weasel.

Before the war, Dr. Klein had done some research in Canada on navigating snow, mostly in connection with aircraft skis. He recommended a full-track vehicle with the lowest possible unit pressure between the tracks and the snow. From past experience, he knew that snow, when compressed on metal tracks, wheels and sprockets, formed solid ice that would make the vehicle slide and might wreck the tracks. The solution was a wide rubber-coated track and sprockets, and rubber-tired wheels. The first

"Weasels", designated the M28 Cargo Carrier, were available in sufficient numbers in December 1942. This model was later altered. Size, spacing and number of wheels, load distribution on the track, and the location of the centre of gravity were changed. The engine was moved near the front to improve its climbing ability. The new model was the M29.

The Weasel never fulfilled the purpose for which it was primarily created. Operation "Plough", aimed at the destruction of some twenty power plants in northern Norway, was cancelled. Later in the war, Studebaker produced an amphibious Weasel, the M29C. This model became available in the autumn of 1944 and was used by Canadian troops in Italy, The Netherlands and Germany. Meanwhile, another operation involving snow vehicles had been considered.

In the spring of 1942, Churchill proposed a scheme of "unrolling the Nazi map of Europe from the top"[3] to help the hard-pressed Russians. A force of perhaps one or two, perhaps even three divisions, perferably Canadian, with anti-aircraft units, were to embark in late 1942 and sail as if it were a convoy proceeding to Archangel. The force would then turn south at an appropriate point to land and capture airfields in northern Norway from which the *Luftwaffe* had been attacking convoys to the USSR. A second convoy could bring reinforcements and supplies for several months. For this large scale operation, known as "Jupiter", a special snow-traversing vehicle would be required.

The Department of Munitions and Supply in Ottawa had earlier been asked by the British Ministry of Supply to

produce a vehicle that could travel over snow. It selected the B-12 snowmobile that Bombardier had developed, and work to improve this vehicle was undertaken by designers, engineers and draughtsmen employed by the Canadian government. Their improvements were incorporated by Bombardier into his later snowmobiles.

In the light of cross-country tests, further improvements were made. The skis, instead of being kept rigid, were pivotted on rocker arms and compression springs to allow the vehicle to navigate bumps and ditches; wider and stronger ladder-like tracks consisting of two rubber belts with thicker steel cross links carried on four bogie wheels were designed to carry the wider cab. The improved model was named the B-1. An order for a snow vehicle using the same principles, but of greater load-carrying capacity, was also placed by the British Ministry of Supply in the spring of 1942 for Operation "Jupiter". The Canadian Army Engineering Design Branch, with the cooperation of General Motors of Canada, developed a snow-traversing vehicle to carry either a Bofors gun and crew, cargo, or a dozen armed men. This vehicle, however, never went into production, while production of an unarmoured B-1 that could transport eight men ended during the winter of 1942-43. A total of some 130 of the improved half-track Bombardier snowmobiles, made by the company of Cusson Frères, were shipped to Scotland but never saw action.

Operation "Jupiter" was never carried out, but Canadian engineers continued to work to produce a better vehicle for travel over snow and mud. It was apparent to

those involved in the B-1 that the skis, being vulnerable to frequent damage, were the major flaw in its suitability for military purposes. Moreover, on terrain sparsely covered with snow, they slowed down the vehicle and made steering difficult. On removal of the skis, climbing power and handling of the Bombardier were improved.

A full-track vehicle with sprockets at the front and without skis, capable of navigating all types of terrain, promised to be still better. In the late spring of 1943, work began on a two-man armoured reconnaissance snowmobile for possible use in the mountains of Italy. This vehicle was known as Snowmobile Armoured Canadian Mk. I. The production of some four hundred began in the spring of 1944 by the firm of Farand and Delorme. Several reached Italy, but not in time to be used against the enemy.

Snow-traversing features developed under the impetus of the Second World War, and refined for postwar military use, are perpetuated in vehicles for commercial transportation, ploughing sidewalks, and recreation.

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1. M.G. Bekker, *Theory of Land Locomotion* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1956), 32.

2. N.G. Duckett, "Recent Mechanical Transport Trials Carried Out in Canada", *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol.V. No. 4 (July 1928), 446-53.

3. W.S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 348-50.



M28

Engine.....Studebaker (6 cyl.rear mounted)
Dimensions (in inches).....67 H
(56 without canopy), 132 L, 60 W
Gross weight.....4,650 lbs.
Track width..... 15 in.
Personnel..... 2



M29

Engine.....Studebaker (6 cyl. in front)
Dimensions (in inches).....71 H
(54 without canopy), 126 L, 66 W
Gross weight.....5,425 lbs.
Track width..... 20 in.
Personnel..... 4



M29C used by the 2nd Canadian Division reconnaissance regiment and machine gun battalion commanders in the Scheldt estuary, Oct - Nov 1944.

Engine.....Studebaker (6 cyl., in front)
Dimensions (in inches)..... 71 H
(57 without canopy), 190 L, 68 W
Gross weight.....6,000 lbs.
Track width..... 20 in.
Personnel..... 4



Snowmobile - Bombardier, Half Track B-1

Engine.....Ford V-8 (rear mounted)
Dimensions (in inches)..... 80 H, 206 L, 77W
Gross weight.....6,000 lbs.
Track width..... 17.5 in.
Personnel..... 8



General Motors Half Track Snowmobile

Engine.....Cadillac V-8 (rear mounted)
Dimensions (in inches).....19.25 H, 259.6 L, 97 W
Gross weight.....11,140 lbs.
Track width..... 31.5 in.
Personnel..... 12



Snowmobile, Armoured, Canadian, Mk I. Designed to carry a crew of two, a No. 19 wireless set, a Bren and a Sten gun, ammunition, crew kit and vehicle stowage. Armour was 7 mm for front, sides and rear, 14 mm for the face-plate area. A Cadillac engine was adopted from an American light tank, the M-5 (General Stuart VI)

Engine.....Cadillac V-8 (rear mounted)
Dimensions (in inches).....68 H, 154 L, 101 W
Gross weight.....9,400 lbs.
Track width..... 35 in.
Personnel..... 2



Penguin Mark III. For post-war use in Canada's north, the Department of National Defence developed a snowmobile known as the Penguin. It had the same chassis as the Canadian armoured snowmobile, the major modification being the cutting away of the armour plating and its replacement by an enclosed duralumin cab.

Engine	Cadillac V-8 (rear mounted)
Dimensions (in inches)	94 H, 162 L, 101W
Gross weight	9,800 lbs.
Track width	35 in.
Personnel	5

TWO NEAR VC'S OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR

P.R. Marshall

By the spring of 1902 the South African War was drawing to a close. The tactics of both sides had changed greatly in the past three years. The Boer forces were now reduced to scattered bands, using hit-and-run methods to prolong a war that had been lost two years before with the defeat of General Cronje at Paardeburg. In the Western Transvaal, Boer commandos under General J.H. De la Rey had been waging a guerrilla campaign with impunity. Fine horsemen, excellent shots and masters of the art of ambush, they had inflicted disaster on two British columns. One, a supply convoy, had been trapped and razed. The other, formed for retaliation and commanded by Lord Methuen, the senior British officer in the area, was to meet with humiliating defeat. In addition to wiping out the column, the Boers captured its commander and De la Rey had graciously returned him. The British had devised a method of cornering their elusive enemy which, although quite sound, required a large number of mounted troops thoroughly versed in march discipline.

When a Boer force was known to be operating in a specific area, it was sealed off with fencing and block-houses manned by infantry and constabulary troops. Bounds were established and the foot-soldiers moved up. Spread out across the selected area, the mounted units would then move forward to force the enemy back into the block-house system. There the barrier was impassible to all but a few lone horsemen, willing to risk death in an attempt to cut the fencing and evade capture.

The concern and publicity arising from the latest De la Rey successes were to bring 16,000 British troops pouring into the Western Transvaal, among them a reconstituted 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles. The Canadian force, representing all provinces, had been raised the previous November. Many of its members had already seen active service in South Africa and their commanding officer, Lt.-Col. T.D.B. Evans, a veteran of the North West Rebellion and the Yukon Field Force, had commanded the original 2nd CMR's in South Africa the year before. The unit became the largest component of the 1800-man column led by Colonel Cookson, a British officer. Similar groups were formed with newly arrived troops and soon the Western Transvaal was seething with various columns intent on the extermination of General De la Rey and his few thousand. General Walter Kitchener (brother of the British Commander-in-Chief) was charged with this responsibility. From his base at Klerksdorp he and his columns were soon on the move. In one particular sweep the Cookson column, through torrents of rain, covered a distance of 85 miles in 23 hours, gathering in 200 enemy, some 100 wagons and carts, and over 1500 head of horses and cattle.

On 29 March 1902, in an all-out effort to take the De la Rey commandos, Kitchener moved his troops and headquarters to the settlement of Driekuil. From there he ordered the Cookson column to push on and reconnoitre the area where the almost dry Brak Spruit met the Kleinhardt River, some forty miles west. Breaking camp at 3 a.m., the troops began their long trek. With out-riders detailed and scouts to the fore the column and its accompanying baggage convoy made their way through the dust and heat of the enemy dominated wastelands of the high veldt.

By 10 a.m., as the column neared its objective, one of Lieut. T.H. Callaghan's scouts rode in bearing news of the enemy. They had come across the tracks of a small party of Boers and two field pieces, and Callaghan[1] was continuing in pursuit. Sending sixty men of the Damant Horse (named after their commanding officer, Lt.-Col. F.H. Damant) to join Callaghan as a cutting-out party, Cookson ordered his column to press on.

Callaghan's party got close enough to the Boers to see the dust raised by the guns. As they drew still nearer, however, the horsemen became careless. In their headlong race they galloped into view of a farm nestled in a grove of thickets, where Boer marksmen were waiting for them. By the time Cookson and his force reached the cutting-out party it had lost two men killed, nine wounded, and fifteen horses, and the enemy rearguard had withdrawn.

The column's difficulties were by no means over, for as it saw to the wounded and prepared to resume the march, large numbers of enemy appeared in the distance. Lining the horizon like a great dark cloud, their presence on the hills rising gradually on both sides of the farm and Brak Spruit, left no doubt as to their intentions. Cookson despatched most of his force to form an outer screen while he made ready for battle.

As the troops began their defensive preparations the slower-paced baggage convoy came into sight. Moving in extended line, with the left wing of the 2nd CMR's escorting it while the right wing moved in advance, the dust it raised gave the illusion of a much larger force.

The Boers, ever cautious, hesitated to attack. This afforded Cookson an opportunity to take the initiative. He brought his guns forward and into action and, at the same time moved his command post from the farm and thickets to the Brak Spruit. In the dry stream bed, by another farm, "Boschbult", he would make his stand. There he was soon joined by the unmolested baggage convoy and its escort. Little time was wasted in "laggering" the wagons and digging in to make the camp a formidable defensive stronghold.

In the meantime, outside the camp, the Boers began to attack with forces spread out over a distance of nearly four miles, and were moving steadily closer to the detachments of the Damant Horse, the 28th Mounted Infantry, the Royal Horse Artillery Mounted Rifles and Kitchener's Fighting Scouts that formed the outer screen. At 2 p.m. the tempo of the attack increased. Subjecting the camp to withering shell, pom-pom and rifle fire from the southwest, the Boers continued to press the units outside the perimeter to the north and east. Confusion reigned within the camp when a few of the native drivers, terrified by the shelling, hitched up their teams and attempted to flee. Although most of them were brought under control, some of the wagons floundered into sections of the 28th Mounted Infantry on the perimeter. The resulting turmoil caused some of the 28th to be isolated, and then all but annihilated, by a Boer charge. The other detachments forming the outer screen found their situation becoming more precarious by the moment. A pause in returning fire brought with it further pressure from some of the bolder Boer bands. Although the defenders were able to beat off these attacks before they could properly form, it was only a matter of time before one would succeed and the screen would be broken.

By 3:30, with the defences nearing completion, orders were passed to outside units to withdraw into the more secure confines of the camp. For many who were to use the last of their ammunition to carry out the withdrawal the orders had not arrived a moment too soon. Some parties got back only through the excellent fire control of other groups. Forming successive fronts, they retired cautiously, covering each other's flanks in turn, and there were few casualties.

Near the farm, where the cutting-out party had been ambushed, were now stationed two troops of the 2nd CMR's under the command of Lieut. W.B.M. Carruthers.[2] Between them and the Boers were the mounted infantry of the outer screen. A determined charge of several large Boer commandos turned the mounted infantry's withdrawal into rout. With ammunition exhausted, they fled through Carruthers' command leaving it to bring up the rear. Carruthers, sensing the need for decisive action, dismounted his men, and shouting "No surrender", ran forward to meet the attackers; he shot the leading enemy at fifteen paces. His men were to follow, and soon a ferocious battle raged. With little or no cover, the ground offering only gentle natural folds topped by short stubble, the Canadians continued to carry the fight to the enemy. Although some of the Boers were able to lodge themselves in trees from which they could bring to bear a cross-fire, some time was to pass before they had sufficiently reduced Carruthers' troops to a point where a final charge would overwhelm them. Their gallant fight was to be the subject of a report proudly submitted to the Minister of Militia and Defence by Colonel Evans:

When the camp was being attacked Lieutenant Carruthers' party (about 21 men of the 3rd and 4th troops of 'E' Squadron) had moved off to the right of the farm. Sergeant Hodgins, with another party of the 3rd and 4th troops, 'E' Squadron, was to the right of Lieutenant Carruthers. Still further to right was a detached post of about 75 mounted infantry. Several hundred Boers swept down on this post on the right stampeding the mounted infantry, who galloped through the line occupied by out men. Lieutenant Carruthers, assisted by Sergeant Perry, Corporal Wilkinson, Lance Corporal Bond and Private McCall, kept his men in hand, dismounted them and formed into a half-moon shape to face the Boers. Sergeant Hodgins whose men were being swept off in the stampede, rallied about ten of them and dismounted to meet the attack. The splendid stand made by Lieutenant Carruthers' party without cover of any kind against overwhelming odds, was well worthy of the best traditions of Canada and the whole Empire. Before their ammunition was exhausted 17 out of the 21 were either killed or wounded. Corporal Wilkinson, shot twice, both in the arm and body, continued fighting until he was shot through the eye. He then threw the bolt of his rifle into the long grass to render it useless to the enemy. Private Evans, although mortally wounded through the bowels, exhausted his own ammunition, secured another bandolier, used it up, and as the Boers were making their final rush, he broke his rifle rendering it useless. Private Evans died shortly after being brought into camp. Private Minchin, although wounded in six places, fired his last shot when the Boers were only 25 yards off and threw his rifle bolt into the grass. I have mentioned only a few individual incidents showing the spirit displayed by this party, but an equally invincible courage and devotion to duty was displayed by Lieutenant Carruthers and every one of the party with him.

In the camp, the beleaguered defenders, well entrenched and reinforced by the men of the outer screen, were unconquerable. The few Boers that ventured into the open ground paid dearly.

General De la Rey, knowing the battle had reached a stalemate, broke off the engagement, while Colonel Cookson wisely decided to stand fast until help arrived. On the appearance of a relieving force in the form of another column next morning, the Boers completely withdrew leaving

behind only a few of their hospital carts to tend the wounded.

The losses had been heavy on both sides. The Boers had suffered many casualties in a charge against the farmhouse, which had been repulsed with pom-poms by a group of the RHA Mounted Rifles. Cookson's column had lost 178 men, killed and wounded, and more than four hundred mules and horses. The shortage of animals greatly hampered the return journey to Driekuil.

During the struggle between Carruthers' small command and their attackers, a corporal and five men of the 2nd CMR's had been cut off. Attempting to return to camp, they found the approaches completely under enemy domination. Corporal Knisley[3] decided that the only means of escaping death or certain capture was to reach Klerksdorp, the British station, many miles east. To this end, Knisley led his men out into the great void of the open veldt. For the rest of the day and most of the night the small party pushed southeast, stopping only in the early morning for a two-hour rest. They now fed the horses the last of the oats.

Resuming the journey, Knisley's party made excellent progress until 4 p.m., 31 March, when they encountered enemy scouts. A cornfield offered sanctuary, and with a few shots they were able to drive the Boers off. On leaving the cornfield, however, the small group again came under fire. They were now up against stronger and more determined opposition. As a Kaffir krall was nearby, Knisley ordered them to gallop in extended line to its shelter. From there, they were able to hold the burghers at bay until evening.

As the night was very dark, with rain teeming down noisily, Knisley seized on the chance to slip out undetected. By leading their muzzled horses on foot, the men were able to spirit their way through the Boer sentinels and, as a further precaution, continued for six more miles before mounting and putting even a greater distance between themselves and the enemy. Finally, overcome with exhaustion and unable to ride further, they collapsed into heaps on the ground and slept, unmindful of the rain. With neither rations nor feed for the horses, and the near certainty that with daylight the commandos would run them down, they decided to look for a feature capable of being defended by a small party and trust in fate. They had not travelled far before a kopje (small hill) ideal to that purpose was spotted. Here they stopped and made ready their defence.

As expected, only a few hours elapsed before their view of a wide, uncluttered horizon was marred by a cluster of horsemen. The enemy scouts, eight in number, were allowed to approach until they could not help seeing the Canadian party. Knisley then gave the command to fire, and the first volley unhorsed two of the enemy. The others soon returned the fire, and were joined by fifty more Boers. For five hours the battle continued, with the burghers attempting to work forward while Knisley's men, exchanging calls of encouragement and warning, tried to keep the enemy from reaching positions more to their advantage. Finally, however, the Boers managed to pin them down with flanking fire. By this time the corporal and Private Day were no longer responding to calls and the remaining four men had little choice but to surrender.

NMC photo 11-2775
A typical British blockhouse in the Western Transvaal

From PAC photo C22274
'...commandos could be seen gathered together upon a small rise of land, with rifles stacked, awaiting to surrender' -- Lt. R.H. Ryan, 2 CMR, with reference to the final disarming of the Boers, June 7, 1902

From PAC photo C 22275

General De la Rey (centre) surrenders to the British forces

The Boers first disarmed them. Congratulating them on the fine fight they had put up, they then let them bury their two dead and offer prayers. The ceremony over, they stripped them of their equipment and most of their clothing, and allowed them to continue their journey with a safe conduct pass.[4]

On 4 April, four nearly naked, skeleton-like figures stumbled into the safety of Klerksdorp. The ordeal that had begun five days before was now over. After a few days in hospital, recovering from the effects, they rejoined their unit and were soon once more engaged in the long treks of the column warfare.

So ends the tale of a small, all but unknown battle in South Africa, The 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles were destined to take part in other great drives in the Western Transvaal, but none of their exploits would compare with those of Lieut. Carruthers, Corporal Knisley and their men. Both cases, it would seem, merited the Victoria Cross. Corporal Knisley had, in fact, been recommended for the VC at Leliefontein and had received the Distinguished Conduct Medal instead. That might be the reason he was not recommended after the action at Boschbult, but the main one is that existing VC regulations did not provide for posthumous awards.[5] In Carruthers' case, it may have been too difficult to judge whether the officer himself or one of his men, dead or alive, most deserved the VC.

Notes

1. 'Casey' Callaghan had won the Distinguished Conduct Medal as Scout Corporal of the previous 2nd CMR's. When that unit returned to Canada, he joined the Canadian Scouts, a band of irregular horsemen raised in South Africa. He is said to have served as a scout in the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War.

In the First World War he went overseas as a major but reverted to lieutenant in order to see action, and was killed leading a platoon in the assault on Vimy Ridge.

2. Carruthers had resigned a previous commission in order to serve in South Africa as a sergeant of the Royal Canadian Regiment. After the war he was appointed staff officer in charge of army signalling. He died in 1910.

3. Cpl. WA Knisley, formerly a trooper of the Royal Canadian Dragoons.

4. In this 'last of the gentleman's wars', surrender was an easy alternative to the traditional last stand. While Boer prisoners were confined for the duration, the Boers themselves were not prepared to accommodate prisoners and would instead simply confiscate their weapons, equipment and clothing for their own use, and release them. Thus it is all the more to the credit of Carruthers' and Knisley's groups that they fought until they had nothing left to fight with.

5. In 1902 the VC was awarded to representatives of a number of officers and men who might have been eligible had they survived. It was often awarded posthumously during the First World War, but the principle was not explicitly recognized by warrant until 1920.

OBITUARIES

Colonel George Burling Jarrett (Ret.), curator of the US Army Ordnance Museum from 1946 to 1966, died July 1, 1974.

Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Augustine Durnford (Ret.), curator of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps Museum and host of the OMMC conference of 1974, died November 16.

The Canadian General: Sir William Otter. Desmond Morton. Canadian War Museum Historical Publication No. 9, publ. by A.M. Hakkert Ltd. 423 pp. $12.95

Reviewed by Philip Chaplin

If you are the kind of reader who starts with the preface, the first statement of Dr. Morton's that you will find in the biography of his ancestor is that the book "sums up almost a decade of digging in the history of the Canadian Militia." Morton has indeed cultivated that field as if it were his private preserve. Anyone undertaking research in it will waste his time if he does not first read *Ministers and Generals;* and *The Canadian General.* If he is particularly interested in 1885, he must also read *The Last War Drum*, and refer again and again to the Telegrams of the North-West Campaign - edited by Morton and Roy.

Ministers and Generals is a historical study of the Militia from Confederation to the dismissal of Lord Dundonald, and it defines Morton's special period. *The Canadian General* covers a longer span of time, for William Otter joined the Militia in 1862 and retired from it for the second and last time in 1920. The two books are far more closely related than might appear at first blush, for Otter was Canada's first professional soldier, although contemporaries at the Horse Guards would probably have said that he was the first Canadian Militiaman to have some idea of what it meant to be a professional soldier.

Otter's field service included the Fenian Raid of 1866 (captain and adjutant at the Battle of Ridgeway), the North-West Rebellion of 1885 (commanding the Battleford column), and the South African War (commanding the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment). His home service started in the ranks of the Queen's Own Rifles, and led, via its command, to that of the Infantry School Corps (later the RCR) and eventually to Chief of the General Staff and Inspector General. In the First World War he was recalled to take charge of internment operations.

The author calls Otter a snob on several occasions. If he was, as seems most probable, he at least made his snobbishness work for him, for it provided part of the drive that made him Commanding Officer of a regiment of Militia while still a poorly paid clerk in the Toronto office of the Canada Company. He must have regarded his final rank of General as no more than appropriate for a grandson of a Bishop of Chichester.

Highlight Preview

The record of a long and full life is presented chronologically, except that at the beginning of each alternate chapter there is a preview of its highlight. This somewhat artificial trick, commonly used once in a novel, may at first seem tiresome in a biography, but at least these previews are not passages lifted out of their proper places in the narrative. In each case the episode is fully described later on, and from a different aspect; the preview often presents the thoughts that may have been going through Otter's mind, while the second treatment is more objective.

The reader gathers from the notes that one of the results of the writing of the book is that the Otter Papers have been given to the Public Archives of Canada. It would have been reasonable to hope that this recently available source would have thrown new light on the adoption of the Ross rifle by the Militia, for Otter was chairman of the committee that recommended it. If we are disappointed, it is because he left no record of his private opinions on the matter, and Morton can conclude only that he concurred for reasons of political expediency, and that he repented of it for the rest of his life.

Good maps are essential, both to campaigning and to military history. One of the circumstances that led to the rout at Ridgeway was the lack of accurate maps, and the maps are an unfortunate feature of the book. All are somewhat difficult to follow, and all would have been improved by being printed on a larger scale, except for the one that occupies a whole page. Another misfortune that the book has suffered is a number of annoying misprints, including the kind that produces a correctly spelt word that does not fit the context.

By contrast, the illustrations are excellent, and demonstrate again that in the days when photography was more difficult, if someone went to the trouble of taking a picture, he went to the extra trouble of making it a good one. Fourteen of them are from the Otter Collection, and twelve appear not to have been previously published.

Professor Morton's "Introduction: In Justification", is a short essay on Victorian biographies and autobiographies. In it he tells us that his subject collected and filed his papers as if he intended to attempt something of the kind, but never took it in hand. We are not told that this book is intended to fill the gap, and the author does express some diffidence in approaching the subject: he says, "The biography of a relative, however remote, induces suspicions

of familial piety." He prudently does not deny such a motive in himself, for his book is, in fact and in a very modern sense, a work of just that kind of piety. A great-grandson of Sir William, the author has revealed the character of a man whose life work went a long way towards preparing the Canadian Militia for the part it had to play in the two World Wars.

The character that is clearly defined by his own acts and by others words is that of a tough, unbending man who was hard on his troops and hard on himself, and who had to endure trouble and disappointment in his own family. Indeed it was this character that enabled Otter to be the only professional soldier in the country, and to succeed as a non-political general in an era when patronage was necessary for promotion to a lesser personality. He was, in fact, a good and strong man in the best Victorian tradition, and his biography is a most valuable addition to Canadian historiography.

From Canadian Defence Quarterly, *Autumn 1974.*

Canada Invaded, 1775-76. George F.G. Stanley. (Canadian War Museum Historical Publication 8) Toronto: Hakkert, 1973. Pp. xiv, 186. $8.95.

The acquisition of Canada was one of the first objects of Americans in the American Revolution; it was Canada, rather than their assertion of Maritime rights, that was the Americans' first object in the War of 1812; Canada was still embedded in the folklore of northern Americans. It appears vividly in Walt Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* of 1855, in "Our old feuillage"....

To Canadians since, the invasion and occupation of Canada by the Americans in the spring and summer of 1775 has sometimes seemed quixotic, as if Americans might have been better doing something else. The invasion that Professor Stanley describes so vividly, though it came ultimately to a stop before the walls of Quebec, was a forceful,and relevant, expression of American military policy. Not for nothing had Americans fought wars against the French for a century. Phips before the walls of Quebec in 1690, the Walker expedition of 1711, the great invasion and conquest of 1759-60, were not only British, but British-American. Boston rejoiced, as London, over the news of the fall of Quebec in 1750. The substitution of British for French in Canada only sharpened the American perception of real danger from that quarter once

the troubles of the 1770's began. The inclusion of the Quebec Act of 1774 in the American list of "intolerable acts" of that memorable year is no accident. The Americans' bitter dislike of the Quebec Act helped to pull all the northern colonies together. Whatever gifts that Act held for the French Canadians, Americans could not contemplate with equinimity the abandonment of a proposed Assembly for the new province, the guarantee of the Roman Catholic religion, or the extension of the boundaries of Quebec half way down across America's back door, clear to the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi.

Fighting broke out at Lexington on April 19, 1775. The Quebec Act came into force on May 1, 1775. Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen captured Fort Ticonderoga (Fort Carillon is the French name) from the British on May 10, 1775. The concatenation of these events is not fortuitous, but logical. They were followed almost at once by the fall of Crown Point (Fort St. Frederic) on Lake Champlain, and shortly afterward by Arnold's seizure of a sloop at St. Jean, on the Richelieu within 50 miles of Montreal. All this was done, almost by instinct one might say, before the Continental Congress at Philadelphia had had time to formulate a policy. But within a month the idea of invasion of Canada had been accepted there.

This story of the 1775-1776 invasion is one of Professor Stanley's best books. In a way it rounds out a book he has recently published, *New France: the last phase, 1711-1760*. The book that follows in the Centenary History of Canada, Hilda Neatby's *Quebec 1760-1791*, covers the invasion of 1775-1776 in 8 pages. G.M. Wrong's *Canada and the American Revolution* (New York, 1935) has more, but the invasion is rather lost in the larger study. Professor Stanley has a good theme and is out to enjoy himself. The result is excellent military history, robust, clear-headed, and told with great style; in addition, it is splendidly illustrated and has good maps. It is a fine book for a winter evening, then one is glad to be reading by a fire, and not with Benedict Arnold struggling with his expedition up the Kennebec in mid-October, 1775, trying to reach Lac Megantic and the headwaters of the Chaudiere: or, still more, to read rather than to experience, the final assault on Quebec in a driving snow storm, at 4 a.m., Sunday, December 31, 1775.

P.B. Waite
From The Dalhousie Review,
Winter, 1973-74.

Air Command: A Fighter Pilot's Story. Air Vice-Marshal Raymond Collishaw with R.V. Dodds. London, William Kimber & Co. Ltd., 1973. 256 pp., 36 photos. £ 3.50. (Distr. in Canada by Clarke, Irwin, Toronto. $12.95)

The highest-scoring, top-ranking surviving ace of World War I is, of course, Raymond Collishaw who certainly needs no introduction to members of this Society and to readers of this *Journal*. With his 60 confirmed aerial victories, earned while flying with 3 Naval Wing, 3 (Naval), 10 (Naval), 13 (Naval) and No. 203 Squadron, his stories and articles have frequently appeared in this *Journal* but those writings have only scratched the surface of his career as his autobiography attests. And what a fabulous career he has had! *Air Command* traces that career, step by step, from the time he joined the Fisheries Protection Service in Canada and went to sea in 1908, through his subsequent service and ultimate transfer into the Royal Naval Air Service in 1915. His subsequent campaigns on the Western Front and his post-war service in South Russia are highly detailed in their accounting. His between-the-wars service, ashore and afloat, and his years of service in World War II in the Western Desert Command are presented in good detail. The important thing to consider here is that Collishaw documents names, places and dates with an amazing total recall of memory and that he pays close attention to details that are so important to an historian. The result of all this is that this autobiography serves historians and researchers well as an important, and excellent, reference source.

The major portion of his book deals with his World War I experiences and his subsequent duty in South Russia from the Armistice into the very early 1920's. The sorties of the legendary "Black Flight" are vividly described as are his encounters with the "gentlemen" of Manfred von Richthofen's *Jagdgeschwader* and his duel with Karl Allmenroder. Along the way he debunks several myths and legends that most historians have come to accept as fact and at the same time he gives us a very good insight into the operational function of the RNAS in combat service. No details are spared, however trivial they may appear to be. The reader will instantly recognize that Collishaw's approach to fact-finding reporting can serve him well in his ultimate research for documentation of evidence is Collishaw's strong point in his autobiography. As stated earlier, this book can almost be considered a reference volume as no doubt my researchers will consistently refer to it in the course of their studies.

No one is more qualified to tell the Collishaw story than the man himself. And he tells it well, in a straightforward, no-nonsense, first-person approach. It is a captivating account, from beginning to end, of a fighter pilot who flew and fought in two major wars in France and Russia, and in Iraq, Sudan and Egypt.

Long associated with Sopwith Pups, 1½ Strutters and Triplanes of Naval Ten, many historians choose to overlook his service with the Seaplane Defence Squadron at which time he gained his first experience on Sopwith Camels. His experiences as a squadron commander have been glossed over by many other writers but Collishaw brings these experiences into vivid detail with the good and bad of his job. As a historical journal devoted to the air war of 1914-1918 we are prone to ignore post-Armistice happenings and events in our publication simply because they took place after the expiration of organized fighting on the Western Front after 11 November 1918. Collishaw's flying experiences in South Russia against the Bolsheviks and Reds are quite hair-raising and fraught with many types of danger that were unlike those he faced on the Western Front. It is all part of the complete Collishaw story.

His years of command in World War II as an Air Commodore in Egypt and the Western Desert Command are very well told. These years, too, form an integral part of the Collishaw story and for most readers these adventures will be new and highly informative.

Collishaw sums up his military service career with these words: "Looking back over my service career, I find myself much in sympathy with the late Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, the creator of the famed Sherlock Holmes. Sir Arthur always regarded the tales that he wrote about the Baker Street detective as 'bread and butter' creations of little literary merit and he wished to be remembered for his historical novels. Alas! The historical novels which he felt reflected his true literary ability are today little read but Sherlock Holmes is known to all.

"I feel that my days of command in North Africa, when we had to outwit and outfight a numerically superior enemy by a combination of deception, superior tactics and fighting spirit, represent by far my best effort. Yet if I am known at all to my fellow Canadians and others it is through more carefree days, when as a young fighter pilot, with the limited responsibilities of a flight and squadron commander on the Western Front, I had the good fortune to shoot down a number of the enemy without in turn being killed."

The reader will find after finishing *Air Command* that he has many things with which to remember Collishaw, both as a fighter pilot and a man, and that it was not all confined to his ability to knock down 60 enemy aircraft and to live to tell about it. This volume definitely belongs on your bookshelf. It is highly recommended.

From Cross & Cockade (*Journal of the Society of World War I Aero Historians*), *Summer 1974*

Relentless Verity: Canadian Military Photographers since 1885. Peter Robertson. Public Archives of Canada/University of Toronto Press, 1973. $10.95.

Dedicated to all Canadian military photographers, *Relentless Verity* is 234 pages long and includes 158 full-page photographs. The text and the photo captions are presented in both English and French.

As a panorama of Canada's military history, the book provides a rare insight into many aspects of war. A photograph by James Peters shows Louis Riel as a prisoner at Batoche in May 1885. First World War photos by William Rider-Rider include closeups of a Canadian artillery officer offering a biscuit to a child whose mother has just been killed in a bombardment, and of a dead German machine gunner in the bed of the Canal du Nord. Among the Second World War pictures are George Kenneth Bell's snapshot of French civilians laying flowers on the grave of a Canadian soldier, Gilbert Alexander Milne's photo of HMCS *Swansea* in rough seas off Bermuda, and Henry Edward Price's of the interrogation of a Canadian airman following a raid on Hamburg. A Korean war photograph by Wilfred Harold Olson shows dead Canadian soldiers left behind by Chinese troops; only the feet are visible.

The book covers peacetime as well as wartime activities. One photo by Gordon Evan Thomas shows troops marching off Parliament Hill after the Changing of the Guard, another a northern training exercise.

The 158 photos constitute the favorite works of 13 photographers, each of whom has sought to show the Canadian serviceman's struggle both to do his duty and to maintain his spirit of humanity. They are tangible proof of the importance of providing for a first-hand pictorial record of life in the armed forces and the

plight of civilians in the battle area. Military photography is not a luxury but rather, as the author points out, has been a valuable resource both for public information and as a propaganda tool. Mr. Robertson also describes the struggle of photographers with the environment, inadequate equipment and facilities, and bureaucracy.

The only errors detected are not in the captions but in references, on page 234, to obtaining copies. The references to pages 62-66, 66, 190 and 197 should read 98-100, 102 and 226-233.

Dick Malott

RECORD REVIEWS

"Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Band salutes the Diamond Jubilee of the Regiment 1974". Director of Music, Captain L. Camplin. Westmount WSTM 7321-S. $3.50. Available only from PPCLI Regimental Headquarters, Currie Barracks, Calgary, Alberta.

The album opens with an interesting fanfare entitled "Declamatory Number One". In keeping with the occasion, it continues with regimental and battalion marches. The Regimental Quick March is a medley consisting of "Has anyone seen the Colonel?", "Tiperrary" and "Mademoiselle from Armentiéres"; the Slow March is "Lili Marlene". The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalion signature marches are, respectively, "The Maple Leaf Forever", "March Winnipeg" (J.S. Egerton) and "Canada" (B. Gimby).

Other marches are Kenneth J. Alford's "The Thin Red Line", Mozart's "Figaro", and two Canadian military marches. "Kapyong", by Captain F.M. MacLeod, commemorates the 2nd Battalion's famous April 1951 battle in Korea. The other Canadian march is Captain H.A. Jeffrey's "Lady Patricia".

Along with this selection of marches are three concert pieces: "New Baroque Suite" (T. Huggins), "Manhattan Tower Overture" (G. Jenkins) and "Reflective Mood". The last-named contains a trombone solo ably performed by Sergeant H. Zandboer.

Having listened to most of the military and civilian band albums, commercial and non-commercial, produced in Canada during the past 15 years, I must state that the technical quality of this recording far surpasses the others. Anyone desiring an exceptional recording of an excellent Canadian band is well advised to forward a cheque or money order to Calgary immediately.

Wayne J. Primeau

"La Citadelle: La Musique du Royal 22e Régiment". Major Jean F. Pierret. Trans-Canada TC-49002. Available from the Regiment, La Citadelle, Quebec, P.Q., G1R 4R8. $3.50 plus 45¢ postage; cheque or money order payable to Fonds régimentaire R22eR.

The recording begins with Major Pierret's "Signature musicale M/R22eR" and ends with his fanfare "La Citadelle" followed by his own arrangement of the National Anthem with heraldic trumpets. Gilles Vigneault's "Marche lente" is arranged by Major Pierret. The album otherwise consists of film music, two pop medleys, a novelty arrangement of "Auprés de ma Blonde", and a number of contrasting marches ranging from the Coronation March from Meyerbeer's opera "Le Prophète" to Sousa's "Liberty Bell". One of the marches, entitled in other recent albums (and also in the Boosey and Hawkes edition) as "Le Père la Victoire", is referred to here by the more familiar title "Le Père de la Victoire".

In my opinion the technical quality of this album compares favourably with most other Canadian band recordings whereas the artistic quality is superior.

"Songs of a World at War". Janet Webb and the Naafi Singers. MFP 50063.

Bless 'em all	Beer barrel polka
Run rabbit run	If I had my way
Lili Marlene (in English)	Siegfried Line
Yours	When the lights go on again
Kiss me goodnight Sergeant Major	There'll always be an England
	We'll meet again

A delightful record, the best album of World War II songs I have ever listened to. It was made in 1967 and may or may not still be generally available even in England, where I picked up a copy last summer for just under a pound.

"Sousa American Bicentennial Collection", Vol.I. Detroit Concert Band (Leonard B. Smith). H.and L. Record Co. HL 7241. Obtainable from the Band at P.O. Box 5109, Grosse Pointe Branch, Michigan 48236, at special pre-publication prices.

The Thunderer	US Field Artillery
Liberty Bell	We are coming
Our flirtations	George Washington Bicentennial
Washington Post	New York Hippodrome
Belle of Chicago	Pathfinder of Panama
El Capitan	Stars and Stripes forever

In reviewing this record I have concluded that it is one of the most authentic reproductions of Sousa interpretations recorded to this date.

The tempos feel just right, the atmosphere perfect. Leonard B. Smith and his musicians together have created a gem that should be in the library of all music lovers.

All of the necessary attributes required to produce a good recording are utilized such as good dynamics, very good intonation, excellent ensemble attack and release.

I thoroughly enjoyed listening to this record and commenting upon same. It was a pleasure for me. May I recommend it to all.

Captain A.C. Furey
Associate Director of Music
Central Band of the Canadian Armed Forces